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Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets
Abstract: On the domain of balanced multi-sided assignment games (Quint, 1991), the
core is characterized as the unique non-empty solution satisfying derived consistency and
projection consistency. As a consequence, a new characterization of the core of two-sided
assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is provided by using simultaneously the
aforementioned consistency axioms. We also characterize the core on the whole domain
of multi-sided assignment games in terms of singleness best, individual anti-monotonicity
and derived consistency. Again, as a particular case we obtain a new axiomatization for
the bilateral case without making use of the non-emptiness axiom.
Key words: Multi-sided assignment games, Core, Consistency
JEL: C71, C78
Resum: En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignacio´ equili-
brats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core e´s l’u´nica solucio´ no buida que satisfa` de-
rived consistency i projection consistency. Tambe´ es caracteritza el core en tota la classe
dels jocs d’assignacio´ multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual anti-
monotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves ax-
ioma`tiques del core per als jocs d’assignacio´ bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).
1 Introduction
A two-sided assignment market (or game) (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) is defined by two
finite and disjoint sets, usually representing buyers and sellers, a valuation matrix that gives
the profit of every partnership formed by a pair of agents from opposite sectors and a vector
of reservation values that represent the profit of an individual when remaining alone. Since
utility is assumed to be fully transferable, the core of the assignment game consists of the
set of payoff vectors that efficiently allocate the profit achieved by an optimal matching of
buyers to sellers in such a way that no individual or mixed-pair can improve upon. When
utility is not transferable and the only data is the strict preference list of each agent over
the set of agents of the opposite sector, the core of a two-sided matching market (Gale
and Shapley, 1962) consists of those matchings that are individually rational and pairwise
stable, which means that no pair of a buyer and a seller would prefer to be matched together
than keeping their actual partners. Although both models are apparently distinct, almost
parallel properties hold for the cores of the two markets, such as non-emptiness, the lattice
structure and the polarization of interest between both sides of the market.
Axiomatizations of the core of two-sided markets, both for the discrete and continuous
model, appear in the recent literature. Sasaki (1995) provides a first axiomatization of the
core of the assignment game by means of consistency, continuity, couple rationality, indi-
vidual rationality, Pareto optimality and weak pairwise monotonicity. Toda (2003) gives
another axiomatization, by adapting to the assignment game the axioms that characterize
the core of the coalitional games in Peleg (1986), that are (Davis and Maschler) consis-
tency, individual rationality, Pareto optimality and superadditivity. Two additional axiom-
atizations for the core of assignment games are also provided by Toda (2005) by means
of Pareto optimality, (projection) consistency, pairwise monotonicity and individual mono-
tonicity (that can be substituted by population monotonicity). It is observed (Toda, 2006)
that the cores of the discrete two-sided matching markets are characterized by axioms that
almost overlap with the axioms characterizing the core of the two-sided assignment games.
In this setting, Toda characterizes the core by means of weak unanimity, population mono-
tonicity, and Maskin monotonicity (that can be substituted by a consistency axiom). And
the same axioms characterize the core of one-to-many matching markets, that is, when
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agents on one side are allowed to establish partnerships with more than one agent on the
opposite side.
However, as far as we know, no attempt has been made to axiomatically characterize
the core of multi-sided markets (m-sided markets, hereafter), those where more than two
sectors exist and partnerships are formed with exactly one agent of each different sector. In
this paper, we focus on the transferable utility setting and provide two axiomatizations for
the core of the m-sided assignment game. The difficulty in extending the axiomatizations of
the core of two-sided assignment games to the multi-sided case, lies on the fact that m-sided
assignment games may have an empty core. These means that most of the monotonicity
properties used to characterize the core in the two-sided case cannot be straightforwardly
extended. We may have an m-sided assignment game with a non-empty core but when
raising the worth of one matrix entry, or new players entering the market, the resulting
market may have no core elements.
As for the consistency axioms, it was already noted by Owen (1992) that the Davis
and Maschler (1965) reduced game of an assignment game at a core allocation, may not
be an assignment game. However, this reduced game can be replaced with the derived
game, since they both have the same core. In fact, this derived game is also used in Toda
(2003). On the other hand, Toda’s (2005) consistency axiom, that we will name projection
consistency, can be easily generalized to the m-sided case. Therefore, we give a first char-
acterization of the core on the domain of balanced m-sided assignment games by means of
non-emptiness and the aforementioned consistency axioms: derived consistency and pro-
jection consistency. As a consequence, we also obtain a new axiomatization of the core of
two-sided assignment games by using the two consistency axioms.
Finally, on the general domain of m-sided assignment games, we give another ax-
iomatic characterization of the core in terms of three axioms: singleness best, individual
anti-monotonicity and derived consistency. This individual anti-monotonicity axiom is a
weaker form of the anti-monotonicity property introduced by Keiding (1986) to character-
ize the core on the class of cooperative games with non-transferable utility, and it is also
used by Toda (2003) to characterize the core of two-sided assignment games with non-
linear utility functions. Again, we straightforwardly derive another axiomatization for the
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bilateral case without requiring non-emptiness as it is done in other axiomatizations that
appear in the literature. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries
and notations, Section 3 introduces the axioms and Section 4 contains the characterization
results together with the independence of the axioms.
2 Notation and terminology
Let U1, . . . ,Um be a family of countable disjoint sets. An m-sided assignment market
(m-SAM), denoted by γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi), consists of m ≥ 2 different finite sets N1 ⊆
U1, . . . ,Nm ⊆Um of cardinality2 |Ni|= ni where ni ∈N∪{0}, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, with N =
m⋃
r=1
Nr non-empty, an m-dimensional matrix A = (aE)E∈∏mr=1 Nr , and a vector of reservation
values pi ∈ RN , where pii stands for the reservation value of player i ∈ N. We name any
m-tuple of agents E = (i1, . . . , im) ∈ ∏mr=1 Nr an essential coalition.3 Given an essential
coalition E, and when no confusion is possible, we will also use E to denote the set of
players that form the essential coalition E. Given S⊆ E, we write E−S to denote the set of
players in E \S. Each entry aE ∈R represents the profit associated to the essential coalition
E. For all i ∈ N, pii is the worth that player i gets if he doesn’t trade with other players.
Notice that for all essential coalition E and for all i ∈ N, neither aE nor pii are constrained
to be non-negative.
A matching µ among S1 ⊆ N1, . . . ,Sm ⊆ Nm is either µ = /0 or a set of pairwise disjoint
essential coalitions, that is, µ = {Er}tr=1, with 1≤ t ≤min{|S1|, . . . , |Sm|} and E i∩E j = /0
for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , t}, i 6= j. We denote by M (S1, . . . ,Sm) the set of all matchings among
S1, . . . ,Sm. The support of a matching µ ∈M (S1, . . . ,Sm) is defined by supp(µ) = {k ∈
N | there is E ∈ µ and k ∈ E}. Given µ ∈M (N1, . . . ,Nm) and /0 6= T ⊆N, T 6= N, we define
µ|T = {E ∈ µ |E ∈∏mr=1(Nr∩T )} .
Given γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi), for all S1 ⊆ N1, . . . ,Sm ⊆ Nm and all µ ∈M (S1, . . . ,Sm),
2Since we will deal with consistency properties, we allow for the emptiness of some sides of the market.
3Notice that if Nr = /0 for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then there are no essential coalitions and hence no matrix
A. In that case, the market is defined by γ = (N;pi).
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we write
v(S1, . . . ,Sm;µ) = ∑
E∈µ
aE + ∑
i∈⋃mr=1 Sr
i 6∈supp(µ)
pii, (1)
with the convention that any summation over an empty set of indices is zero.
A matching µ ∈M (N1, . . . ,Nm) is optimal for γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi), if for all µ ′ ∈
M (N1, . . . ,Nm) it holds v(S1, . . . ,Sm;µ)≥ v(S1, . . . ,Sm;µ ′). The set of optimal matchings
for γ is denoted byM ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm). With any γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi), we associate a coop-
erative game4 (m-SAG), denoted by (N,wγ), with player set N =
⋃m
r=1 Nr and characteristic
function
wγ(S1∪ . . .∪Sm) = max
µ∈M (S1,...,Sm)
{v(S1, . . . ,Sm;µ)} , (2)
for all S1 ⊆ N1, . . . ,Sm ⊆ Nm.
By (1) and (2), if Sk = /0 for some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then wγ(S1∪ . . .∪Sm) = ∑
i∈⋃mr=1 Sr
pii.
Thus, wγ({i}) = pii for all i ∈ N.
This m-sided assignment game, that allows for agents’ reservation values, is a general-
ization of the m-sided assignment game of Quint (1991), where the reservation values are
null and the assignment matrix is non-negative. In this case we simply denote the market by
γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A). For two-sided assignment games, this generalization was introduced
by Owen (1992) and also used by Toda (2003, 2005) and Llerena et al. (2012) to axioma-
tize the core and the nucleolus, respectively. We denote by Γm−SAM the set of all m-sided
assignment markets and also, for simplicity of notation, the set of their corresponding m-
sided assignment games. When some side of the market is empty, the associated m-sided
assignment game is a modular game generated by the agents’ reservation values.5 More-
over, it can be shown that every assignment game in Γm−SAM is strategically equivalent to
an m-sided assignment game in the sense of Quint (1991).6 As a consequence, Quint’s
4A cooperative game is a pair (N,v), where N is the set of players and v(S) ∈ R for any coalition S ⊆ N,
being v( /0) = 0.
5A game (N,v) is modular if v(S) = ∑i∈S v({i}), for all S⊆ N.
6Two games (N,v) and (N,w) are strategically equivalent if and only if there exist α > 0 and d ∈RN such
that w(S) = α v(S)+∑i∈S di, for all S⊆ N.
Let γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) be an m-SAM and let γ˜ = (N1, . . . ,Nm; A˜) be an m-SAM with null reservation
values and m-dimensional matrix A˜ = (a˜E)E∈∏mk=1 Nk given by a˜E = max{0,aE −∑i∈E pii} , for all essential
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results on the core of the m-sided assignment game with non-negative matrix and null
reservation values extend to Γm−SAM.
Given γ = (N1, . . . ,Nk;A,pi), a payoff vector is u∈RN , where ui stands for the payoff to
player i∈N. We write u|S to denote the projection of a payoff vector u to agents in coalition
S ⊆ N. Moreover, u(S) = ∑i∈S ui, with u( /0) = 0. A payoff vector u ∈ RN is individually
rational for γ if ui ≥ pii, for all i ∈ N, and efficient if u(N) = wγ(N).
The core of the m-sided assignment market is formed by those efficient payoff vectors
u ∈ RN satisfying coalitional rationality for essential and one-player coalitions:
C (γ) =
u ∈ R
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u(N) = wγ(N),
∑i∈E ui ≥ aE ,∀E ∈∏mr=1 Nr,
ui ≥ pii,∀i ∈ N
 . (3)
If µ is an optimal matching of γ ∈ Γm−SAM, any core allocation u ∈ RN satisfies
∑i∈E ui = aE for all E ∈ µ, and
ui = pii for all i ∈ N \ supp(µ).
(4)
3 Axioms
In this section, we introduce the axioms we will use to characterize the core of the m-sided
assignment market. We begin by defining the concept of a solution on the domain of m-
sided assignment markets. The next two definitions generalize those introduced by Toda
(2005).
Definition 1. Let γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM. A payoff vector u ∈ RN is feasible for
γ if there exists a matching µ ∈M (N1, . . . ,Nm) such that:
1. ∑i∈E ui = aE for all E ∈ µ , and
2. ui = pii for all i ∈ N \ supp(µ).
In the above definition, µ is said to be compatible with u. Notice that a matching that
is compatible with a feasible payoff vector needs not be an optimal matching. Moreover,
taking µ = /0, we have that u = pi is a feasible payoff vector.
coalition E ∈∏mr=1 Nr. Then, for all S⊆N1∪ . . .∪Nm, it can be checked that wγ(S) = wγ˜(S)+∑i∈S pii. Notice
that if Nr = /0 for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then we can take (N,wγ˜) to be the null game.
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Let Γ⊆ Γm−SAM be a given family of m-sided assignment games.
Definition 2. A solution on Γ is a correspondence σ that assigns a subset of feasible payoff
vectors to each γ ∈ Γ.
Given γ ∈ Γ, we write σ(γ) to denote the subset of feasible payoff vectors assigned
by solution σ to the assignment market γ . The domain of balanced m-sided assignment
markets is denoted by
Γc = {γ ∈ Γm−SAM |C(γ) 6= /0} .
Notice that a solution σ is allowed to be empty. Definition 2 is similar to the one given by
Toda (2005), but we do not impose non-emptiness since our aim is to characterize the core
of m-sided assignment markets, which may be empty.
Non-emptiness (NE) A solution σ on Γ satisfies NE if for all γ ∈ Γ, σ(γ) 6= /0.
Singleness best (SB) A solution σ on Γ satisfies SB if for all γ ∈ Γ such that µ = /0 is an
optimal matching, it holds pi ∈ σ(γ).
Singleness best simply says that if remaining unmatched is optimal for every player,
then the vector of reservation values should be an outcome of the solution.
The next axiom is a weaker version of anti-monotonicity introduced by Keiding (1986)
and also used by Toda (2003). Before stating the axiom we need to introduce some addi-
tional notation.
Let pi and pi ′ be two vectors of reservation values of agents in N = N1∪ . . .∪Nm, and µ
a matching among N1, . . . ,Nm. We write pi ≥µ pi ′ if for all i ∈ N (a) pii = pi ′i if i 6∈ supp(µ),
and (b) pii ≥ pi ′i if i ∈ supp(µ).
Individual anti-monotonicity (IAM) A solution σ on Γ satisfies IAM if for all γ =
(N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γ, all γ ′ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi ′) ∈ Γ and all u ∈ σ(γ), if pi ≥µ pi ′ for
some matching µ compatible with u in γ , then u ∈ σ(γ ′).7
Individual anti-monotonicity says that if the reservation values decrease, in the sense
just commented before, any payoff vector in the solution of the original market should
7This IAM is introduced by Toda (2003). There, when characterizing the core of two-sided assignment
games, it is shown that IAM is implied by efficiency and super-additivity, which are the properties that take
part in the characterization theorem.
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remain in the solution of the new market. Notice that in both m-sided markets the matrix
A is the same
Consistency (or reduced game property) is, perhaps, the most fundamental property
used to axiomatize solutions. Roughly speaking, this principle says that there is no dif-
ference in what the players of the reduced game get in both the original game and in the
reduced game.8 Different consistency notions have been used to characterize the core on
the domain of cooperative games, but probably the best known is based on the Davis and
Maschler (1965) reduced game. On the domain of two-sided assignment games, Owen
(1992) shows that the core is not consistent with respect to this kind of reduction. To over-
come this drawback, he introduces the derived market. Next we introduce a multi-sided
version of Owen’s derived market. The idea behind this reduced market is as follows:
in the derived m-sided assignment market, once agents outside a given coalition T leave
the market taking their corresponding payoffs in u, agents in T trade in the submarket
but reevaluate their reservation values taking into account that they can interact with some
agents in N \T . Each agent i ∈ N ∩T has the option of remaining unmatched, and thus
getting his reservation value, or matching with some players under the assumption that at
least one of them is outside T , and preserving for them their payoffs in u. The best of these
two choices determines the new reservation value of agent i ∈ T . Formally,
Definition 3. Let γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM, /0 6= T ⊆ N, T 6= N, and u ∈ RN . The
derived m-sided assignment market of γ relative to T at u is γT,u = (N1 ∩ T, . . . ,Nm ∩
T ;AT ,piT,u), where AT = (aE)E∈∏mr=1(Nr∩T ) and pi
T,u ∈ RT is the vector of reservation val-
ues defined as follows:
piT,ui = max
pii, maxE∈∏mr=1 Nr, i∈E
E∩(N\T )6= /0
aE − ∑j∈E−{i} u j

 , (5)
for all i ∈ T .
Next we define consistency with respect to the derived m-sided assignment game and
prove that the core satisfies this property.
Derived consistency (D-CONS) A solution σ on Γ satisfies D-CONS if for all γ =(N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi)∈
Γ, all /0 6= T ⊆ N, T 6= N, and all u ∈ σ(γ), then γT,u ∈ Γ and u|T ∈ σ(γT,u).
8See Thomson, 2003; Driessen, 1991 for surveys on consistency.
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Proposition 4. On the domain of balanced m-sided assignment games Γc, the core satisfies
derived consistency.
Proof. Let γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γc, /0 6= T ⊆ N, T 6= N, u ∈ C(γ), and consider the
derived market γT,u relative to T at u. We have to see that u|T is an efficient payoff vector
satisfying coalitional rationality for individual and essential coalitions in γT,u. Notice first
that if Nr = /0 for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then C(γ) = {pi}. Moreover, piT,ui = pii for all i ∈ T ,
and thus C(γT,u) = {pi|T}. Now suppose Nr 6= /0 for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Take i ∈ T , adding
and subtracting ui in the second term of expression (5) we have
piT,ui = max
pii,ui + maxE∈∏mr=1 Nr, i∈E
E∩(N\T )6= /0
{
aE −∑
j∈E
u j
} . (6)
Since aE−∑ j∈E u j ≤ 0, for all E ∈∏mr=1 Nr, we have piT,ui ≤max{pii,ui}= ui, for all i∈ T,
which proves individual rationality of u|T . Coalitional rationality for essential coalitions is
clearly satisfied. To check efficiency of u|T , it is enough to see that µ|T is optimal for the
derived market, that is, µ|T = {E ∈ µ |E ∈∏mr=1(Nr∩T )} ∈M ∗γT,u(N1 ∩ T, . . . ,Nm ∩ T ).
Let µ ′ ∈M ∗γT,u(N1∩T, . . . ,Nm∩T ) be an optimal matching in γT,u. Then,
∑
E∈µ ′
aE + ∑
i∈T
i 6∈supp(µ ′)
piT,ui ≤ ∑
E∈µ ′
(
∑
i∈E
ui
)
+ ∑
i∈T
i 6∈supp(µ ′)
ui
= ∑
i∈T
ui
= ∑
E∈µ|T
(
∑
i∈E
ui
)
+ ∑
i∈T
i 6∈supp(µ|T )
ui
= ∑
E∈µ|T
aE + ∑
i∈T
i 6∈supp(µ|T )
piT,ui .
(7)
The inequality in expression (7) comes from u∈C(γ) and piT,ui ≤ ui, for all i∈ T. To see the
last equality in (7) notice that if i ∈ T \ supp (µ|T) , then either i 6∈ supp (µ) or i ∈ E ∈ µ
but E ∩ (N \T ) 6= /0, which in both cases implies piT,ui = ui. Indeed, in the first case ui = pii
and expression (6) becomes piT,ui = pii = ui. In the second case pi
T,u
i = max{pii,ui} = ui.
This concludes the proof.
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The second consistency axiom we use to characterize the core is projection consistency.
This consistency principle was used by Toda (2005) to axiomatize the core on the domain
of two-sided assignment games and it is based on the notion of projected market.
Definition 5. Let γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM, /0 6= T ⊆ N, T 6= N and u ∈RN a feasi-
ble payoff vector compatible with a matching µ ∈M (N1, . . . ,Nm). An m-sided assignment
market γT,up = (N1∩T, . . .Nm∩T ;AT ,piT ) is said to be the projected market of γ relative to
T at u and µ if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. If E ∈ µ and E ∩T 6= /0, then E ⊆ T .
2. AT = (aE)E∈∏mr=1(Nr∩T ).
3. For all i ∈ T, piTi = pii.
Notice that the projected market relative to T at µ is just the submarket associated
to coalition T under the requirement that this coalition does not separate members of an
essential coalition in µ (that is, either they are all inside T or all outside T ).
Next we introduce consistency with respect to the projected market and argue that the
core satisfies this property.
Projection consistency (P-CONS) A solution σ on Γ satisfies P-CONS if for all γ =
(N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γ, all /0 6= T ⊆ N, T 6= N, and all u ∈ σ(γ), then γT,up ∈ Γ and u|T ∈
σ
(
γT,up
)
.
Clearly, any core element u ∈C(γ) satisfies individual rationality and coalitional ratio-
nality for essential coalitions in γT,up . To check efficiency, it is enough to see that if µ is a
matching compatible with the core element u, then µ|T = {E ∈ µ |E ∩T 6= /0} is an optimal
matching in γT,up .
Proposition 6. On the domain of balanced m-sided assignment games Γc, the core satisfies
projection consistency.
4 Characterizations
In this section, we characterize the core on the domain of balanced m-sided assignment
games by means of non-emptiness, derived consistency and projection consistency. As a
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consequence, we obtain a new characterization of the core of two-sided assignment games
without domain restriction by using simultaneously the aforementioned consistency ax-
ioms. Finally, we characterize the core on the whole class of m-sided assignment games
by derived consistency, singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity. A direct conse-
quence of this result is a new axiomatization for the core of two-sided assignment games
without making use of the non-emptiness axiom. The first fact is that, on the domain of
m-sided assignment games, any solution satisfying derived consistency selects a (possible
empty) subset of core elements. Before proving this inclusion, it is worth to remark that in
the characterization of the core of two-sided assignment games given by Toda (2005), ef-
ficiency, pairwise monotonicity and individual monotonicity, or efficiency, pairwise mono-
tonicity and population monotonicity,9 imply core selection. Thus, pairwise monotonicity
is the common factor to ensure core selection. Roughly speaking, pairwise monotonicity
requires that if the worth of a pair of agents increases, while the other entries of the ma-
trix remain unchanged, then there exists a payoff vector in the solution of this new market
where the total payoff to this pair of agents does not decrease. Example 7 below shows
that when we increase a matrix entry in an m-sided assignment market, the core of the new
market may be empty. This is why in our characterizations the inclusion of the core is guar-
anteed by derived consistency instead of by the aforementioned monotonicity properties.
Example 7. Let γ = (N1,N2,N3;A) be a 3-SAM with null reservation values defined by the
set of agents N1 = {1,2},N2 = {1′,2′},N3 = {1′′,2′′} and the following matrix, where an
optimal matching is in bold face
A =
 0 0
0 0
  0 1
1 1
 .
Notice that u = (0,0,0,0,0,1) ∈C(γ).
Now consider γ ′ = (N1,N2,N3;A′) where
A′ =
 0 0
0 1
  0 1
1 1
 .
As the reader can easily check, C(γ ′) = /0.
9See Toda (2005) for formal definitions.
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The characterization results are proved with the help of the following lemmata.
Lemma 8. Let σ be a solution on Γ ⊆ Γm−SAM satisfying derived consistency. Then, for
all γ ∈ Γ, σ(γ)⊆C(γ).
Proof. Let σ be a solution on Γ satisfying D-CONS. Take γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γ and
u ∈ σ(γ). If Nr = /0 for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then by feasibility u = pi . Since, in this
situation, C(γ) = {pi}, we have u ∈C(γ). Assume now Nr 6= /0 for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For
all i∈N =N1∪ . . .∪Nm consider the derived m-sided assignment market relative to T = {i}
at u. By D-CONS ui ∈ σ
(
γ{i},u
)
, and by feasibility ui = pi
{i},u
i . Now from (5) it follows
ui ≥ pii. Let E ∈ ∏mr=1 Nr be an essential coalition and i ∈ E. Again by D-CONS and
feasibility, ui = pi
{i},u
i ≥ aE−∑ j∈E, j 6=i u j for all E ∈∏mr=1 Nr with i ∈ E. Hence, ∑i∈E ui ≥
aE for all E ∈ ∏mr=1 Nr. Once seen that u satisfies coalitional rationality for essential and
one-player coalitions, it remains to check efficiency.
Let µ ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm) be an optimal matching and µ ′ ∈M (N1, . . . ,Nm) a matching
that is compatible with u. Such µ ′ exists since u is a feasible payoff vector. Then,
wγ(N) = ∑
E∈µ
aE + ∑
i 6∈supp(µ)
pii
≤ ∑
E∈µ
(
∑
i∈E
ui
)
+ ∑
i 6∈supp(µ)
ui
= ∑i∈N ui
= ∑
E∈µ ′
(
∑
i∈E
ui
)
+ ∑
i 6∈supp(µ ′)
ui
= ∑
E∈µ ′
aE + ∑
i6∈supp(µ ′)
pii.
Since µ is optimal, the above inequality implies ∑E∈µ aE +∑i 6∈supp(µ)pii = ∑E∈µ ′ aE +
∑i6∈supp(µ ′)pii, and thus ∑i∈N ui = wγ(N), which concludes the proof.
The next lemma is a generalization of Lemma 3.1 in Toda (2005) to balanced m-sided
assignment games.
Lemma 9. Let σ be a solution on Γc satisfying non-emptiness and projection consistency.
If for all γ ∈ Γc, σ(γ)⊆C(γ) then, for all γ ∈ Γc, σ(γ) =C(γ).
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Proof. Let σ be a solution on Γc satisfying NE and P-CONS. Take γ =(N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi)∈
Γc, u ∈ C(γ) and µ an optimal matching for γ . If Nr = /0 for some r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then
C(γ) = {pi} and by NE and the assumption σ(γ)⊆C(γ) we have σ(γ) = {pi}=C(γ). Oth-
erwise, let k1 ∈U1 \N1, . . . ,km ∈Um \Nm. Now define the market γ ′ = (N′1, . . . ,N′m;A′,pi ′)
where N′r = Nr∪{kr}, for all r ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. The elements of the m-dimensional matrix A′
are
a′E :=

0 if E = (k1, . . . ,km),
aE if E ∈∏mr=1 Nr,
∑i∈E\{k1,...,km} ui otherwise,
(8)
and the vector of reservation values pi ′ is
pi ′i :=
 0 if i ∈ {k1, . . . ,km},pii otherwise. (9)
Take µ ′ = µ ∪{E ′}, where E ′ = (k1, . . . ,km). Let us first show that µ ′ is an optimal match-
ing for γ ′. Take any optimal matching µ ′′ for γ ′. Then, making use of expressions (8) and
(9), we have
∑
E∈µ ′′
a′E + ∑
i 6∈supp(µ ′′)
pi ′i = ∑
E∈µ ′′
E∈∏mr=1 Nr
a′E + ∑
E∈µ ′′
E∩E ′ 6= /0
a′E + ∑
i 6∈supp(µ ′′)
pi ′i
= ∑
E∈µ ′′
E∈∏mr=1 Nr
aE + ∑
E∈µ ′′
E∩E ′ 6= /0
(
∑
i∈E\E ′
ui
)
+ ∑
i 6∈supp(µ ′′)
pi ′i
≤ ∑
E∈µ ′′
E∈∏mr=1 Nr
(
∑
i∈E
ui
)
+ ∑
E∈µ ′′
E∩E ′ 6= /0
(
∑
i∈E\E ′
ui
)
+ ∑
i6∈supp(µ ′′)
i6∈E ′
pii
≤ ∑
i∈N1∪...∪Nm
ui
= ∑
E∈µ
(
∑
i∈E
ui
)
+ ∑
i6∈supp(µ)
ui
= ∑
E∈µ
aE + ∑
i6∈supp(µ)
pii
= ∑
E∈µ ′
a′E + ∑
i6∈supp(µ ′)
pi ′i .
This implies that µ ′ = µ∪{E ′} is optimal for γ ′ and the payoff vector u′ ∈RN′1× . . .×RN′m
defined by u′i = ui if i ∈ N1∪ . . .Nm, and u′i = 0 if i ∈ E ′, is efficient for γ ′. Now it is easy
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to see that u′ ∈ C(γ ′). Moreover, C(γ ′) = {u′}. Indeed, suppose there is z 6= u′ such that
z ∈ C(γ ′). Since a′E ′ = 0 and, for all i ∈ E ′, pi ′i = 0, we have zi = 0 = u′i, for all i ∈ E ′.
Let i ∈ N1 ∪ . . .∪Nm and E an essential coalition such that i ∈ E but E−{i} ⊂ E ′. Then,
zi = ∑ j∈E z j ≥ a′E = ∑ j∈E\E ′ u j = ui = u′i. Finally, by efficiency we obtain zi = u′i, for all
i ∈ N1∪ . . .∪Nm. Thus z = u′. Now by NE and the assumption σ(γ)⊆C(γ) for all γ ∈ Γc,
we have u′ ∈ σ(γ ′). Since γ is a projected market of γ ′ relative to N1∪ . . .∪Nm at u′ and
µ ′, by P-CONS we conclude that u ∈ σ(γ).
Lemma 10. Let σ be a solution on Γm−SAM satisfying singleness best and individual anti-
monotonicity. Then, for all γ ∈ Γm−SAM, C(γ)⊆ σ(γ).
Proof. Let σ be a solution on Γm−SAM satisfying SB and IAM. Let γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi)∈
Γm−SAM, u∈C(γ) and µ a matching compatible with u. Notice that µ is optimal for γ. Now
consider the market γ ′ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi ′) where pi ′ = u. It follows straightforwardly that
µ ′ = /0 is an optimal matching for γ ′ and hence, by SB, u ∈ σ(γ ′). Finally, since pi ′ ≥µ pi ,
by IAM we get u ∈ σ(γ).
Our first characterization, stated in Theorem 11, follows from Lemma 8 and Lemma 9.
Theorem 11. On the domain of balanced m-sided assignment games Γc, the core is the
only solution satisfying non-emptiness, derived consistency and projection consistency.
Since two-sided assignment markets are always balanced, an immediate consequence
of Theorem 11 is that, on this domain, the core is the only non-empty solution satisfying
at the same time both consistency principles. This fact highlights the internal robustness of
the core.
Corollary 12. On the domain of two-sided assignment games, the core is the only non-
empty solution satisfying derived consistency and projection consistency.
Combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 10, we get an axiomatization of the core on the whole
class of m-sided assignment games.
Theorem 13. On the domain of all m-sided assignment games Γm−SAM, the core is the only
solution satisfying singleness best, individual anti-monotonicity and derived consistency.
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As a consequence of the above theorem we obtain a characterization of the core of
two-sided assignment markets that, unlike all previous characterizations that can be found
in the literature, makes no use of the non-emptiness assumption.
Corollary 14. On the domain of two-sided assignment games, the core is the only solution
satisfying singleness best, individual anti-monotonicity and derived consistency.
Next we show that no axiom in each of our characterizations is implied by the others.
To this end, we introduce different solutions satisfying all axioms but one in each theorem.
Example 15. For all γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM, let us consider
σ1(γ) = /0.
Clearly, σ1 satisfies D-CONS, P-CONS and IAM, but not NE and SB on both Γm−SAM
and Γc.
Example 16. For all γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM, let us consider
σ2 (γ) =
u ∈ R
N
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
u feasible forγ,
ui ≥ pii,∀i ∈ N,
u(N) = wγ(N)
 .
Notice that if u ∈ σ2(γ), all matching µ compatible with u is optimal.
It can be easily checked that σ2 satisfies P-CONS, SB, IAM, NE but not D-CONS on
both Γm−SAM and Γc.
From Lemma 8, we know that any solution satisfying D-CONS selects core elements.
To find a solution satisfying D-CONS and NE we extend the notion of symmetrically
multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocations (Tejada and Rafels, 2010) to balanced m-sided
assignment games with reservation values.10
Given γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM, i ∈ N and an essential coalition E ∈ ∏mr=1 Nr
such that i ∈ E, we denote by E γi,E the set of essential coalitions containing agent i but
different from E. Formally, E γi,E = {E ′ ∈∏mr=1 Nr | i ∈ E ′, E ′ 6= E} .
The following definitions generalize the ones given by Tejada and Rafels (2010).
10Tejada and Rafels (2010) generalize the notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations
(Rochford, 1984) to balanced assignment games with more than two sectors.
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Definition 17. Given γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γc, µ ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm) and u ∈C(γ), the
vector of threats tγ,µ(u) ∈ RN is defined, for all i ∈ N, by
tγ,µi (u) =

max
E ′∈E γi,E
pii,aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u j
 , if i ∈ E ∈ µ
pii, if i 6∈ supp(µ).
(10)
The reader can check that tγ,µ(u) does not depend on the optimal matching chosen.
Thus, we write tγ(u) instead of tγ,µ(u).
Definition 18. Given γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γc, µ ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm) and u ∈C(γ), the
vector of symmetrically bargained incomes bγ,µ(u) ∈ RN is defined, for all i ∈ N, by
bγ,µi (u) =

tγ,µi (u)+
1
m
(
aE −∑
j∈E
tγ,µj (u)
)
, if i ∈ E ∈ µ
pii, if i 6∈ supp(µ).
(11)
It can be checked, and again it is left to the reader, that bγ,µ(u) does not depend on the
optimal matching chosen. Hence, we write bγ(u) instead of bγ,µ(u).
Definition 19. Given γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γc, the set of symmetrically multilateral-
bargained allocations is SMB(γ) = {u ∈C(γ) |u = bγ(u)} .
Example 20. For all γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γm−SAM, let us consider
σ3(γ) :=
 /0, if γ 6∈ ΓcSMB(γ), if γ ∈ Γc.
Notice that σ3 satisfies SB. Moreover, the fact that D-CONS and NE on Γc hold for σ3 is
proved in the Appendix. Trivially σ3 satisfies D-CONS on Γm−SAM if it satisfies D-CONS
on Γc. In general, the set of symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations is a proper
subset of the core (see Example 1 in Tejada and Rafels, 2010). Hence, from Theorems 11
and 13 we conclude that it does not satisfies P-CONS on Γc and IAM on Γm−SAM.
Thus, σ1,σ2 and σ3 show the independence of the axioms in Theorems 11 and 13, and
Corollaries 12 and 14
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Appendix
In this appendix we show that the symmetrically multilateral-bargained solution (Definition
19) satisfies derived consistency and non-emptiness on the domain of balanced m-sided
assignment games.
Proposition 21. On the domain of balanced m-sided assignment games Γc, the symmetri-
cally multilateral-bargained solution satisfies derived consistency.
Proof. Take γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γc, /0 6= T ⊆ N, T 6= N, and u ∈ SMB(γ).
If µ = /0 ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm), then C(γ) = SMB(γ) = {pi}. As we have seen in the proof
of Proposition 4, µ|T = /0 ∈M ∗γT,u(N1 ∩T, . . .Nm ∩T ). Since the core satisfies D-CONS,
we have SMB(γT,u) =C(γT,u) = {pi|T}.
Assume now that for all µ ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm) it holds µ 6= /0. Take one such µ ∈
M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm). If µ|T = /0, taking into account that µ|T = /0 ∈M ∗γT,u(N1∩T, . . . ,Nm∩T ),
then we obtain SMB(γT,u) = C(γT,u) = {u|T}, where the last equality follows from the
D-CONS of the core. Otherwise, that is if µ|T 6= /0, take i ∈ T. If i 6∈ supp(µ|T ), then
bγ
T,u
i (u|T ) = pi
T,u
i . Since u ∈C(γ) and µ|T ∈M ∗γT,u(N1∩T, . . .Nm∩T ), by D-CONS of the
core we have ui = piT,ui and thus b
γT,u
i (u|T ) = ui. If i ∈ supp(µ|T ), take E ∈ µ|T such that
i ∈ E. Then, from expressions (5) and (10) we have
tγ
T,u
i (u|T ) = max
E ′∈E γT,ui,E
piT,ui ,aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u j

= max

pii,
max
E ′∈∏mr=1 Nr, i∈E ′
E ′∩(N\T )6= /0
aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u j
 ,
max
E ′∈E γT,ui,E
aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u j


= max
pii, maxE ′∈E γi,E
aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u j


= tγi (u).
Hence, also for all i ∈ supp(µ|T) we get ui = bγi (u) = bγT,ui (u|T ). Thus, u|T ∈ SMB(γT,u).
Moreover, since SMB(γT,u)⊆C(γT,u), we obtain γT,u ∈Γc, which concludes the proof.
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Proposition 22. On the domain of balanced m-sided assignment games Γc, the symmetri-
cally multilateral-bargained solution satisfies non-emptiness.
Proof. Take γ = (N1, . . . ,Nm;A,pi) ∈ Γc. As we have remarked before, for all S ⊆ N,
wγ(S) = wγ˜(S) +∑i∈Spii, where γ˜ = (N1, . . . ,Nm; A˜) being A˜ = (a˜E)E∈∏mr=1 Nr with a˜E =
max{0,aE −∑i∈E pii}, for all essential coalition E ∈ ∏mr=1 Nr. From Tejada and Rafels
(2010) we know that SMB(γ˜) 6= /0. Given u˜ ∈ SMB(γ˜), we will see that u˜+pi ∈ SMB(γ).
Notice first that u˜+pi ∈C(γ). Given µ˜ ∈M ∗˜γ (N1, . . . ,Nm), it can be checked that µ = {E ∈
µ˜ |aE >∑i∈E pii} ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm). If aE ≤∑i∈E pii for all E ∈ µ˜ , then C(γ˜) = SMB(γ˜) =
{0} and µ = /0 ∈M ∗γ (N1, . . . ,Nm), which implies C(γ) = SMB(γ) = {pi}. If there is E ∈ µ˜
such that aE > ∑i∈E pii we take i ∈ N and distinguish two cases:
• Case a: i 6∈ supp(µ). If i 6∈ supp(µ˜), then trivially u˜i = 0. Otherwise, that is if
i ∈ supp(µ˜), there exists i ∈ E ′ ∈ µ˜ and a˜E ′ = 0. This also implies u˜i = 0. Then,
bγi (u˜+pi) = pii = u˜i +pii.
• Case b: i ∈ supp(µ). Then, there is E ∈ µ˜ such that i ∈ E and aE > ∑i∈E pii. Now
t γ˜i (u˜) = max
E ′∈E γ˜i,E
0, a˜E ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u˜ j

= max
E ′∈E γ˜i,E
0,max
{
0,aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′
pi j
}
− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
u˜ j

= max
E ′∈E γ˜i,E
aE′>∑ j∈E′ pi j
0,aE ′− ∑j∈E ′pi j− ∑j∈E ′−{i} u˜ j

= max
E ′∈E γ˜i,E
aE′>∑ j∈E′ pi j
0,aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
(pi j + u˜ j)−pii

or, equivalently,
t γ˜i (u˜)+pii = max
E ′∈E γ˜i,E
aE′>∑ j∈E′ pi j
pii,aE ′− ∑
j∈E ′−{i}
(pi j + u˜ j)

and we obtain
t γ˜i (u˜)+pii = t
γ
i (u˜+pi).
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Finally, for E ∈ µ with i ∈ E we have
u˜i +pii = b
γ˜
i (u˜i)+pii
= t γ˜i (u˜)+
1
m
(
a˜E −∑
j∈E
t γ˜j (u˜)
)
+pii
= tγi (u˜+pi)+
1
m
(
max
{
0,aE −∑
j∈E
pi j
}
−∑
j∈E
(
tγj (u˜+pi)−pi j
))
= tγi (u˜+pi)+
1
m
(
aE −∑
j∈E
tγj (u˜+pi)
)
= bγi (u˜+pi).
Thus, we conclude that u˜+pi ∈ SMB(γ).
References
[1] Davis, M., Maschler, M., 1965. The kernel of a cooperative game, Nav. Res. Logist.
Quart. 12, 223–259.
[2] Driessen, T., 1991. A survey of consistency properties in cooperative game theory,
SIAM rev. 33, 43–59.
[3] Gale, D., Shapley, L.S., 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage, Am.
Math. Mon. 69, 9–15.
[4] Keiding, H., 1986. An axiomatization of the core of a cooperative game, Econ. Lett.
20, 111-115.
[5] Llerena, F., Nu´n˜ez, M., Rafels, C., 2012. An axiomatization of the nucleolus of as-
signment games, Working Paper E12/286, Facultat d’Economia i Empresa, Universi-
tat de Barcelona.
[6] Owen, G., 1992. The assignment game: the reduced game, Ann. Econ. Stat. 25/26,
71-79.
[7] Peleg, B., 1986. On the reduced game property and its converse, Int. J. Game Theory
15, 187–200.
20
[8] Quint, T., 1991. The core of an m-sided assignment game, Games Econ. Behav. 3,
487–503.
[9] Rochford, S.C., 1984. Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment
market, J. Econ. Theory 34, 262-281.
[10] Sasaki, H., 1995. Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems, Int. J. Game
Theory 24, 373–397.
[11] Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The Assignment Game I: The Core, Int. J. Game
Theory 1, 111–130.
[12] Tejada, O., Rafels, C., 2010. Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in
multi-sided assignment markets, Int. J. Game Theory 39, 249–258.
[13] Toda, M., 2003. Consistency and its converse in assignment games, Int. J. Math.
Game Theory Algebra, 13, 1–14.
[14] Toda, M., 2005. Axiomatization of the core of assignment games, Games Econ. Be-
hav. 53, 248–261.
[15] Toda, M., 2006. Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets, Int. J. Game
Theory 34, 13–31.
[16] Thomson, W., 2003. Consistent allocation rules, Mimeo, University of Rochester .
21
